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PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS
Appellant states that there are no prior or related appeals in
this case.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as an appeal of right.
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to
78-36-11 (1953), as amended,

The

UTAH CODE ANN.

and 78-2a-3 (1953), as

§§

amended.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
MR. HOM'S EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WAS STATUTORY RATHER THAN
CONTRACTUAL.

The trial court dismissed Mr. Horn's breach of contract claim,
ruling that there was no express, written contract governing the
employment relationship between the parties.

R.1126.

The trial

court ruled further that the nature of the employment relationship
between the parties was statutory rather than contractual.
The trial court also held that there was no implied
relationship

between

the

parties.

R.1126.

R. 1126.

contractual

Whether

a

public

employee's relationship with is employer is contractual or statutory
is a question of law.

Further, this appears to be a question of

first impression in Utah.
law,

it

should

be

reviewed

Newspapers, 835 P.2d
Inv.,

Ltd.

v.

Salt

Because this issue presents a question of
for

correctness.

West

v.

Thompson

179, 182(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Fashion

Lake

County,

Place

776 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

This issue was raised and preserved at the trial court in Mr. Horn's
Complaint,

Amended

Complaint

and

Memorandum

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
621

respectively.

in

Opposition

R. 1-17, 215-240, and 470-

Further, this issue was explicitly

-1-

to

raised in

fendants' Motion

to Amend Answers

to Complaint, Memorandum

in

pport of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Reply Memorandum

in

pport of Motion for Summary Judgment.
0, and 632-651 respectively.

R. 307-315, 316-343; 344-

Finally, this issue was expressly

eserved when it was ruled on by the trial court.
II.

R. 1126.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT
THE DISCOVERY RULE DID NOT APPLY TO MR. HOM'S HANDICAP
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM.

The trial court also dismissed Mr. Horn's perceived handicap
scrimination claim (R.1126-1127) on the ground that Mr. Horn's claim
s barred by the applicable four year statute of limitation because
) there was no relation back, (2) the original complaint was not
led within four years from the time that the § 504 claim accrued,
d (3) the discovery rule is not appropriate under the circumstances
this case.

R. 1127.

These issues present questions of law which

is Court should review for correctness with no deference to the
gal conclusions of the trial court.
sociates,

910 P.2d

1252, 1257

Selvage

v.

J.J.

(Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Johnson

&

Mr. Horn

sponded to and raised the issues of "relation back" and discovery
le

and

its

application

in

his

Memorandum

fendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

in

Opposition

to

R. 470-621. Moreover, the

ial court expressly ruled on this issue thereby preserving it.

R.

26-1127.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT
MR. HOM MAY BE COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING A CLAIM
FOR HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE IT DID NOT "RELATE
BACK" TO THE DATE OF FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT.
The

trial

court

found

that

Mr.

Horn's

perceived

handicap

scrimination claim did not relate back because he was collaterally
topped from raising this issue.

-2-

R. 1127.

While the order signed

by the trial court does not state collateral estoppel as the grounds
for

finding

that

the

claim

did

not

relate

back,

the

argument

initiated by the Defendants and responded to by Mr. Horn was based on
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

R.

359, 488-489, 658.

Whether

or not the issue was precluded presents a question of law which this
Court should review for correctness.
(Utah 1993).
their

Timm v.

Dewsnup,

This issue was raised and argued by the parties in

respective

briefs.

R.

344-440,

470-621.

preserved as it was ruled upon by the trial court.
IV.

851 P. 2d 1178

The

issue

is

R. 1127.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
THERE WAS NO COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
INHERENT IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.

The trial court held that Mr. Horn's claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was dismissed because
there was no contract governing the employment relationship between
the parties.

R. 1127.

Whether or not a contract and therefore and

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists is a question
of law. This Court should review the trial court's factual finding
for correctness with no deference.
Corp.,
Central,

883 P. 2d 285, 289

Republic

Group,

(Utah Ct. App. 1994);

872 P.2d 1073, 1078-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Inc.
Dubois

v.

Won-Door
v.

Grand

This issue was

raised and preserved in Mr. Horn's Complaint, Amended Complaint and
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
R. 1-17, 215-240, and 470-621 respectively.
expressly ruled on this issue.

Also, the trial court

R. 1127.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

-3-

29 U.S.C. § 7041 Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and programs;
promulgation of rules and regulations (See Addendum)
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 67-19-18 Dismissals and demotions - Grounds Disciplinary action - Procedure - Reductions in force. (See Addendum)

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-23 (1953), as amended.
Within six years - Mesne
profits of real property - Instrument in writing. (See Addendum)

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-12-25 (1953), as amended.

Within four years. (See

§ 78-12-26 (1953), as amended.

Within three years. (See

Addendum)
UTAH CODE ANN.

Addendum)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Horn's lawsuit regards issues surrounding the termination of
his employment with the Utah State Department of Public Safety.
Course of Proceedings and
piSPQsition by the District Coyrt Below
Mr.

Hom filed his original complaint in the Third Judicial

District Court on March 21, 1994. The Defendants filed a Motion to
Dismiss Complaint on or about July 19, 1994. Mr. Hom filed a response
to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Hom filed an Amended Complaint.

On or about March 6, 1995, Mr.

The Defendant Utah Department of

Public Safety filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint on or about
March 15, 1995.

The remaining Defendants filed their Answer to the

Amended Complaint on or about March 24, 1997.

On or about March 24,

1997 the Defendant Department of Public Safety withdrew its Motion to
Dismiss. The trial in this case was set to begin on February 25,

As it existed at the times relevant to Mr. Horn's termination from his employment at
the Department.

-4-

1997.

On or about December 6, 1996, the Defendants filed a motion

seeking leave to amend their answers to Mr. Horn's Amended Complaint.
The Defendants' motion seeking leave to amend was granted and the
Defendants filed their Amended Answers on or about December 30, 1996.
On or about December 6, 1996, the Defendants filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment.

Mr. Horn filed his memorandum in opposition on or

about December 31, 1996.

The Defendants filed their memorandum in

reply on or about January 13, 1997.

On February 10, 1997, Mr. Horn

filed a motion seeking leave of the Court to amend his memorandum in
response on the basis that a Notice of Claim had been properly filed.
The Court did not expressly rule on Mr. Horn's motion.

However, at

the oral argument on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Court ruled that there was no written notice of claim filed.

The

Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on February
14, 1997, and the Court's order was subsequently entered on March 5,
1997.

Mr. Horn timely filed his Notice of Appeal on April 3, 1997.
On May 6, 1997, the Defendants filed a Motion to Transfer Mr.

Horn's appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
granted May 7, 1997.

The Motion to Transfer was

The Utah Supreme Court then poured the case

back over to the Utah Court of Appeals on October 15, 1997.
It also important to note the events which occurred in Mr. Horn's
companion case filed in the United States District Court for Utah.
Mr. Horn filed his original verified complaint in the United States
District Court on September 26, 1991.

The Defendants in that case

filed a motion to dismiss on or about November 11, 1991.

The parties

stipulated to a dismissal of part of Mr. Horn's complaint.

Mr. Horn

submitted his Amended Verified Complaint on or about December 31,
1992.

The Defendants eventually filed an answer to Mr. Horn's amended
-5-

verified

complaint on or about May 26, 1993.

The parties then

engaged in substantial discovery.
On or about August 1, 1994, the Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment. Mr. Horn responded on September 6, 1994.

At the

Defendants request, supplemental briefing on the due process issues
involved in the lawsuit was done by both parties.
1994, Mr. Horn moved
complaint.

the court

for leave

On October 11,

to amend his

verified

The Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr.

Horn's motion to amend.

On or about November 18, 1994, the Court

indicated it would deny Mr. Horn's motion to amend his complaint.
December

1, 1994, the Court granted

summary judgment.

the Defendants1

motion

On
for

On December 8, 1994, the Court signed the order

denying Mr. Horn's motion to amend his complaint.

Mr. Horn then timely

filed a notice of appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on
December 20, 1994.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its

decision in that matter on April 12, 1996. R. 411-416.
Statement Qf Relevant F^ctS
1.

Mr.

termination

Horn's

lawsuit

is

the

as a programmer/analyst

result

of

his

involuntary

from the Utah Department of

Public Safety ("Department"). R. 363, 499, 518-19, 521.
2.
through

Mr. Horn was an employee of the Department from May 20, 1985
March

2,

1990 when

he was

finally

terminated

from

his

employment. R. 2, 518-19, 521.
3.

The reasons enunciated for Mr. Horn's termination from the

Department are (1) Mr. Horn was perceived to be a security threat, (2)
Mr.

Horn

had

insubordinate.
4.

committed

perjury,

and

(3)

Mr.

Horn

had

been

R. 492-93, 494-98.

Douglas Bodrero ("Bodrero") made the ultimate decision to

-6-

terminate Mr. Hom from his employment with the Department.

However,

Bodrero did not personally observe any misbehavior by Mr. Hom.

R.

585-586.
5.

On or about November 13, 1989, Brant Johnson, the Deputy

Commissioner of Public Safety, sent a letter to Mr. Hom notifying him
that Mr. Johnson intended to terminate his employment.
outlined

the

alleged

reasons

for

Mr.

Horn's

This letter

termination

as

insubordination, malfeasance/non-feasance, perjury, and that Mr. Hom
was a security risk. R. 492-93.
6.

Mr. Johnson's decision to terminate Mr. Hom was based on

the recommendation of A. Roland Squire ("Squire"), who was at that
time the Director of Management Information Services.

R. 430, 434-

438,494-98, 932-36.
7.

When Mr. Hom began his employment with the Department,

Arthur Hudachko ("Hudachko") was his immediate supervisor.

R. 526-

27, 964-65.
8.

Prior to being hired by the Department, a complete and

thorough background search and check was done on Mr. Hom. R. 520.
9.

While

employed

promotions. R. 2-3.

with

the Department,

Mr. Hom

received

Mr. Hom also received commendations for his

efforts, dedication and perseverance as an invaluable employee of the
Department.

R. 542, 543, 544; 521-22, 523,524,524.

received near perfect evaluations from Hudachko.
had

Mr. Hom also

However, Hudachko

also did at times counsel Mr. Hom to try and improve his

political and people skills.
10.

R. 527.

One of Mr. Horn's job responsibilities was to be on call in

the event that a programmer was needed to help solve any technical
problem that may arise regarding the computer system for both the
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Bureau of Criminal Investigation ("BCI") and the Driver's License
Division of the Department.

Mr. Horn was on uninterrupted call for

these reasons for a period of four and one-half (4 ^) years. R. 545.
11.

In addition to being on call most of the time, Mr. Horn also

served on a "Request for Proposal Committee" ("RFP committee") formed
by the Department to select a vendor to provide computer software
and/or hardware for the Driver's License Division.

Mr. Horn was

appointed as the technical subcommittee chairperson by Hudachko.
R.499-502, 538.
12.

Prior to being selected to perform on the RFP committee,

Hudachko, Mr. Horn's supervisor at the time, had never given Mr. Horn
any written discipline.
13.

R. 526-27.

At the time the RFP committee began to consider vendor bids

for a new computer system, Bodrero was the Deputy Commissioner for
the Department, and the RFP process was conducted pursuant to his
guidance and supervision. R. 500.
14.

Bart

Blackstock

("Blackstock") of

the Driver

License

Division of the Department was appointed to act as the chairperson of
the RFP committee.
Division,

was

Ertel, an employee of the Driver License

appointed

as

the

chairperson of the RFP committee.
15.

administrative

subcommittee

R. 500.

Mr. Horn and all other RFP committee members were aware of

Utah law governing the bidding processes and procedures that must be
utilized when seeking proposals such as those sought by the RFP
committee in this instance.
16.

R. 500.

Mr. Horn's significant and regular work duties did not

decrease after he was appointed to the RFP committee.
Mr. Horn was faced with a huge increase in work.
-8-

As a result,

R. 528. Because Mr.

Hom had assumed additional work, he would sometimes work 20 hours or
more a day trying to stay on top of his regular duties as well as his
duties associated with the RFP committee.
"gentlemen's

R. 507.

This led to a

agreement11 between Mr. Hom and Hudachko

(Mr. Horn's

supervisor at the time) whereby Mr. Hom would keep track of his
overtime

and

Hudachko

corresponding leave.

would

make

sure

that

R. 499-517; R. 529-530.

Mr.

Hom

got

his

This agreement, for

informal resolution of compensatory time, led Mr. Hom to believe that
he had an ally in Hudachko.
17.

R. 507-508.

Despite the demands of Mr. Horn's regular work duties, Mr.

Hom continued to work diligently on the RFP committee.

However, it

was becoming obvious to Mr. Hom that the RFP process was a political
quagmire.
18.

R. 506.
In an effort to recoup his significant unpaid compensatory

time, Mr. Hom filed a grievance which resulted in him being awarded
some 600 hours of compensatory time.
Hom alienated Hudachko and others.

By filing this grievance, Mr.

The filing of a grievance was not

the way that such things were done at the Department.

R. 508, 529-

531 .
19.

While serving on the RFP committee, Mr. Hom became aware of

activities by certain committee members which were contrary to the
mandates of Utah law, specifically the Utah Procurement Code
ANN. §§ 63-56-1 et

al.).

Utah Procurement Code.

R. 499-517.

(UTAH CODE

Mr. Hom was familiar with the

Other problems of which Mr. Hom was aware

were orders given by Bodrero leading to a manipulation of the vendor
selection process.

Also, Blackstock had a personal relationship with

one of the bidders.
Hudachko

of

his

R.

concerns

499-517.

Mr. Hom

told Blackstock

over

legality

of

the
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and

the process. In

addition, the Mr. Horn engaged in further investigation regarding the
proposal of one bidder (C.A.C.I.) which he felt was deficient in
reporting its technical qualifications.
20.

R. 499-517.

The RFP process consisted of three phases.

The first phase

consisted of solicitation of bids for a partial solution.
this, the RFP committee modified

Following

the "request for proposal" and

solicited bids for a total solution.

During this second phase,

approximately 10 vendors remained on the vendor pool.

R. 500-01;

529.
21.

After

the second

phase, Ertel

and others acted

in an

arbitrary manner in creating a false standard by which to eliminate
some of the vendors.

Mr. Horn strenuously objected to the standard of

elimination chosen.

Mr. Horn believed that the RFP committee could

not

the Utah

lawfully,

merely

under

because

they

had

Procurement

not

disclosed

Code,

their

eliminate

profit

vendors

margins,

especially when such a requirement was not requested in the original
request for proposals.
22.

R. 501.

Despite Mr. Horn's strong objections and concerns regarding

this method of vendor elimination, all of which were voiced in the
RFP committee meetings, the RFP committee returned early from lunch
and voted to use the false standard as a method for eliminating some
of the vendors.
such a vote.
absence.

Mr. Horn was not told to return early from lunch for
In fact, the vote purposely was taken in Mr. Horn's

R. 501-02.

ten to six.

The vote cut the pool of vendor candidates from

Of the remaining six vendors, C.A.C.I. was still a

candidate as were IBM and Digital, both of whom proposed on-site
systems.
23.

R. 502.
The vendor, C.A.C.I, had submitted a bid with its profit
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margins disclosed.

Also, C.A.C.I had submitted a very detailed bid

despite not having been in attendance at a meeting of the bidders
where the details were discussed.
24.

Mr.

subcommittee
C.A.C.I.
users.

Horn, as

he

chairperson,

was

R. 502, 505.

required

further

to

do

as

investigated

the

the

technical

proposal

of

C.A.C.I. had failed to disclose a list of its technical

Through this investigation, it was discovered that the state

of Wyoming was a technical user of the C.A.C.I. system.
Blackstock
system.

of the problems which Wyoming

Blackstock

became

angry

investigation of C.A.C.Ifs bid.
in-depth investigation.
25.

at

had with

Mr.

Horn

Mr. Horn told
the C.A.C.I.

for

doing

the

Ertel was also angry about Mr. Horn's

R. 502.

Mr. Horn told Blackstock and Hudachko that he was concerned

with the legality of the RFP process.

R. 505-06; 539-541.

Despite

the concerns about the legality and possible liability surrounding
the RFP process expressed by Mr. Horn, Bodrero claims that he was not
aware, until after Mr. Horn had filed his lawsuit, that Mr. Horn had
made allegations of illegality in the RFP process.
26.

As a result of mounting tensions in the RFP Committee, Mr.

Horn tendered
Driver's

a

License

resignation

to

Division

and

Blackstock,
the

RFP

Blackstock refused Mr. Horn's resignation.
27.

R. 593.

the

Director

Committee

of

the

Chairperson.

R. 499-517.

Prior to serving on the RFP committee, Mr. Horn had a good

working relationship with his co-workers.

R. 552-506.

However, due

to his deteriorating relationship with the RFP committee members,
Hudachko received several complaints about Mr. Horn from some of the
RFP committee members.

R. 527, 532-533, 534.

Bodrero had also heard

complaints about Mr. Horn from some members of the RFP committee.
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R.

582- 28. Mr. Horn maintains that these complaints tainted Bodrero's
opinion about Mr. Horn. R. 504.
29.

About this time, an internal affairs investigation was done

on Mr. Horn.

The internal affairs investigation was the result of

complaints about Mr. Horn by Ertel.
30.

R. 508; 548-554.

While serving on the RFP committee, Mr. Horn learned that

Bodrero, who was at the time a Deputy Commissioner of the Department
of Public Safety, wanted a specific computer system.
an on-site system.

Bodrero wanted

Bodrero lobbied the RFP committee during the

procurement process for an on-site system. R. 500, 503, 591 . Again,
Mr. Horn perceived these lobbying efforts as illegal.
31.

R. 500, 503.

After this point, the vendor pool had decreased from ten

vendors to six vendors.

Bodrero asked Mr. Horn to do a one-on-one

comparison and technical evaluation of two of the six vendors, IBM
and Digital.

R. 602.

Mr. Horn again objected on the grounds of

illegality under the Utah Procurement Code.

R. 503.

Despite his

objections, Mr. Horn dutifully carried out Bodrero's request.

R. 503.

In fact, other vendors were also displeased and concerned with
Bodrero's order for a one-on-one comparison and they voiced their
concerns by filing grievances.
32.

Bodrero

was

R. 504.

displeased

comparing only two of the vendors.

with

Mr. Horn's objections

to

Mr. Horn maintains that Bodrero

was also displeased because of Mr. Horn's objections to Bodrero's
lobbying efforts and the complaints received by Bodrero from some of
the RFP committee members.
33.

Two

vendors

R. 504.

were

ultimately

consideration, IBM and Digital.
prepared.

selected

for

final

A final report needed

to be

As part of his duties, Mr. Horn prepared the technical
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section of the final report.

In the final report, Mr. Hom noted that

IBM did not have an approved security protocol and therefor was
unacceptable.

When Mr. Hom completed

his section of the final

report, he gave the report to Ertel and Jill Laws.

Ertel and Laws

made substantive changes to the report so that it stated that IBM did
in fact have the appropriate security protocol.
his objections.

R. 504, 505, 549-550.

34.

Mr. Hom again voiced

When it came time for

the final report to be presented to the decision making body, Mr. Hom
was prevented from participating in making the presentation.
would not allow Mr. Hom to make the presentation.
35.
regarding

Bodrero

R. 505.

Bodrero claims that he was unaware of Mr. Horn's concerns
the legality of the RFP process and that he was also

unaware that Mr. Hom had tried to resign from the RFP committee.

R.

593.
36.

Prior to the RFP process coming to a close, Mr. Hom went to

Hudachko to take advantage of their "gentlemen's agreement" regarding
the compensatory leave time.

Because of the stress and pressure that

had been put onto Mr. Hom as a result of being overworked, Mr. Hom
felt like he was alone and had to finally stand up and do something
for himself.

R. 507, 508.

The relationship between Mr. Hom and

Hudachko began to deteriorate.

R. 531-536.

At this point, Mr. Hom

filed a grievance to collect all of his overtime hours.

R. 507, 508,

531-536.
37.

Hudachko was not pleased that Mr. Hom had filed a grievance

to collect his unpaid overtime.

This grievance contributed to the

decrease in communication between Mr. Hom and Hudachko.

R.531-536.

Hudachko threatened Mr. Horn's employment because of this grievance.
R.508.
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38.

Also while the RFP process was ongoing, upon information

and belief, Blackstock approached Fred Schwendiman ("Schwendiman"),
the Director for the Driver's License Division of the Department, and
complained about Mr. Horn's involvement and participation in the RFP
process. R.503.
39.

About this same time, Schwendiman banned Mr. Hom from the

third floor of the building in which Mr. Hom worked. R.503.

The fact

that Mr. Hom had been banned from access to the third floor was an
important

issue

terminate

Mr.

considered
Horn's

by

Bodrero

employment.

when

Bodrero

R.581-582.

It

is

decided
Mr.

to

Horn's

contention that he was banned from the third floor in retaliation for
speaking

out

about

the

illegality

of

the

actions

of

the

RFP

committee. R.503.
40.

From November of 1988 through May of 1989, Mr. Hom was away

from work using the compensatory time awarded to him as a result of
his grievance.
come into work

R.509. During this period, Mr. Hom would on occasion
for the purpose of attending

receiving training.
41.
509.

staff meetings and

R.509.

Mr. Hom returned to work in May 1989 to begin training.

R.

During Mr. Horn's absence, Mr. Hom did not do any work on the

computer system for the Driver's License Division.

R. 509; 555-556.

Instead, another computer programmer/analyst, Kuang-Po-Lee, assumed
the responsibilities with regard to the Driver's License computer
system.
42.

R.510, 556-557.
While Mr. Hom was using his compensatory

became the Management Information Services Director.
in March of 1989.

time, Squire
This occurred

Thus, Squire became Mr. Horn's new supervisor. R.

509, 430-431.
-14-

43.

During

Mr.

Horn's

absence

from

work,

in

response

to

legislative enactments, it was necessary for Lee to make certain
changes to the Driver's License computer system.

R.556-557.

Mr. Hom

did not have occasion to know these changes and modifications nor was
Mr. Hom informed of any changes or modifications prior to supervising
the "annual job run" in July, 1989.
44.

R. 527, 510.

The Driver's License Division of the Department conducted,

during the summer months, a purging process of certain computer
files.
45.

This is referred to as the "annual job run."

R. 509.

Mr. Hom was informed that he would be the individual "on-

call" to supervise the 1989 annual job run on a Thursday afternoon
while Mr. Hom was in a training session.
job

run was

to take

Saturday morning.

place

that

R. 510.

following

The 1989 annual

weekend

beginning

on

Mr. Hom did not have time to become acquainted

with the changes and modifications which had been made to the system
prior to the beginning of the annual job run.
46.

R. 510.

The individuals who were responsible for the annual job

run, Blackstock and Squire, were aware that Mr. Hom had not had any
hands-on experience with the Driver's License system for the previous
ten months.

Despite this knowledge, they assigned Mr. Hom to be in

charge of the annual job run.
47.

R. 558.

The annual job run had been done once a year since 1977.

Ertel, a driver's license employee and user of the system, had been
present at all previous job runs.

R. 509-510, 559.

scheduled vacation during the 1989 annual job run.

However, Ertel
R. 559.

Thus,

Ertel would not be available if anything were to go wrong during the
annual job run.

Blackstock and Squire were aware that Ertel was not

going to be available for the annual job run.
-15-

R. 559.

However, Mr.

Horn was not informed that Ertel was going to be unavailable.

R. 510-

511 .
48.

Bodrero claims that at the time of the annual job run he

was not aware that Ertel had been allowed to take vacation the
weekend of the annual job run.
49.

R. 597.

The annual job run, with one exception, had on all previous

occasions had problems.

R. 555-556.

Thus, it was imperative that

Ertel be available during the annual job run.
50.

R. 510, 511.

Blackstock and Ertel were the only two people at the time

who could schedule the annual job run. Mr. Horn contends that Ertel's
vacation was scheduled during the annual job run in retaliation for
Mr. Horn having voiced his concerns during the RFP process and in
retaliation for Mr. Horn having filed a grievance for his unpaid
compensatory time.
51.

R. 499-517.

As expected, the 1989 annual job run did have problems.

The problems required the attention and presence of Ertel.

Mr. Horn

attempted to contact Ertel and it was at that time that he learned
that Ertel was out of town and unavailable to be of assistance to
him.

R. 510-513.
52.

Mr. Horn contacted Squire after his failed attempts to

contact Ertel and his continuous and exhausting efforts to correct
the problems himself. Mr. Horn explained the situation to Squire.
511-512.
Squire.

R.

Mr. Horn offered several alternative courses of action to
Mr. Horn and Squire decided that the BCI would call Ertelfs

residence every hour and that the system would be put in browse mode
so that police officer users could access necessary information.

R.

511-512.
53.

During this conversation, Squire asked Mr. Horn if he had
-16-

contacted Blackstock.

Mr. Hom told Squire that he had not because

there was nothing that Blackstock could do to help Mr. Hom.

Any

decisions that had to be made would necessarily involve budgetary
considerations.
511-512.

Such a decision could not be made by Mr. Hom.

Moreover, Squire had on a previous occasion told Mr. Hom

that decisions with budgetary
Squire.

R.

R. 512.

implications needed

to be made by

In addition, Squire had previously admonished Mr.

Hom that any business contacts with the Driver's License Division
were to be made by Squire.
54.

R. 499-517.

Ertel was finally located by the BCI.

Horn's call.

Ertel returned Mr.

During this conversation, Mr. Hom stressed that Ertel

needed to come in to work that evening (Sunday).

R. 512.

Ertel told

Mr. Hom that the problem did not sound serious and that she would
meet him early the next morning so that they could get the system
operating at full capacity by 8:00 a.m.
55.
6:00 a.m.

R. 512.

The following day, Mr. Hom arrived at work some time before
Mr. Hom recalls the time because he looked at the clock.

Apparently the entry and security systems did not properly record his
entry into the premises.
56.

R. 512-513.

Mr. Hom had entered the building through a computer door on
He inserted his access

the west side of the building.
punched

in his number

as usual.

R.

downstairs to his secured office area.
was already opened when he arrived.

513.

Mr. Hom

card and
then

went

The door to Mr. Horn's office

The log indicated that the door

had been opened prior to 6:00 a.m. by the security guard.

R. 513.

Upon information and belief, Mr. Hom contends that the Honeywell
access on the west side of the building had been disarmed prior to
his entry into the building and therefore did not record his number
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when he entered the building.

R. 513.

Shortly after Mr. Horn

arrived, he logged onto the computer. Mr. Horn did not, at that time,
log onto the IBM main frame computer so as to avoid a billing for his
usage time.

Mr. Horn eventually logged onto the IBM main frame

computer at 7:05 a.m.
57.

R. 513.

Ertel did not arrive at work until after 8:00 a.m.

She did

not phone to tell Mr. Horn that she was going to be late until after
8:00 a.m.

She left a message with the secretary. R. 513.

did not receive this message.

R. 513.

Mr. Horn

When Ertel finally did

arrive, she and Mr. Horn were able to get the problems corrected and
had the computer up and running at full capacity by 10:00 a.m.

R.

513. 77 and 127.
58.

On or about August 4, 1989, Squire issued a letter of

intent to reprimand Mr. Horn contending
insubordinate

for failing

requested of Mr. Horn.

that Mr. Horn had been

to contact Blackstock

R. 562-567.

as Squire had

On or about August 17, 1989,

Squire issued a letter of reprimand to Mr. Horn. R. 569-574. Mr. Horn
submitted a response to Squire's letter of intent to reprimand.
569-574.
59.

Mr. Horn grieved Squire's letter of reprimand.

R.

R. 513.

Prior to the grievance hearing, Squire called Mr. Horn into

his office and attempted to get Mr. Horn to swear to an oath of blind
and irrational loyalty.

Also, Squire sought an admission of total

fault for the annual job run failure.
Squire's requests.

R. 513-514.

Mr. Horn refused both of

During this meeting, Mr. Horn

explained to Squire that if he disagreed or had any problems with
Squire's directives that Mr. Horn would explain the problem or
disagreement and if Squire still insisted that Mr. Horn do something
that Mr. Horn would obey.

Mr. Horn explained to Squire that he would
-18-

not do anything that would be catastrophic to the system.
not satisfactory to Squire.

This was

Squire tape recorded this conversation.

R. 513-514.
60.

The Appellees contend that during the grievance hearing,

Mr. Horn committed perjury.

R. 499-517.

The Appellees1 accusation of

perjury is the result of their choosing to believe Ertel rather than
Mr. Horn.

However, Ertel testified during her deposition in this case

differently than she testified at the grievance hearing.

Despite

Ertel f s lack of candor, she has not been the subject of discipline
for perjury.
61 .

R. 499-517.

Bodrero was aware that Mr. Horn had been blamed for the

failure of the annual job run and he considered this in determining
whether to terminate Mr. Horn's employment with the Department.

R.

597.
62.

Mr. Horn still had unused

compensatory

time.

submitted a request for leave which was approved by Squire.

Mr. Horn
When Mr.

Horn was using this approved compensatory time, Squire telephoned him
at home and wanted to know why Mr. Horn was not at work.
explained

to Squire that Squire had approved his leave.

denied doing so.
that day.
63.

R. 514, 575-576.
Soon

thereafter,

Squire

placed

he discovered

was going

Mr. Horn on

a

two-week

As a result Mr. Horn was away from work from

September 11 through September 29, 1989.

revoked.

Squire

Mr. Horn came into work and was given no assignments

compensatory leave.

work,

Mr. Horn

that his security

When Mr. Horn returned to
code clearances

had

been

No one told Mr. Horn in advance that his security clearance
to be revoked.

R. 514, 515.

The revocation of his

security clearance prevented Mr. Horn from doing his job. R. 514.
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Mr.

Horn was told that his security clearance was revoked as a result of
an FBI recommendation and because he was considered to be a security
risk.

R. 515.
64.

In

October

1989, Mr.

Horn was

attempting

information for the processing of his grievance.
Department to assist him in that endeavor.
65.

to

gather

He went to the BCI

R. 514-515.

The following day, Mr. Horn was summoned to a meeting with

Richard Townsend

("Townsend"), the BCI chief.

It is Mr. Horn's

recollection that during this meeting, Townsend attempted to dissuade
Mr. Horn from prosecuting his grievance.
66.

R. 515.

Townsend claims that he did not try to dissuade Mr. Horn

from pursuing his grievance.

In fact, Townsend claims that he

reassured Mr. Horn that he would provide whatever assistance he needed
for his grievance but that Mr. Horn would have to secure such material
through Townsend.
uncontrollably.
67.

At this point, Mr. Horn broke down and began to cry
R. 603.

In Townsend's opinion, Mr. Horn was on a "downward spiral"

and he had become "paranoid" and "kooky," and "was a distraught
emotional mess."

R. 605.

in Mr. Horn's demeanor.

Ertel and others also perceived a change

R. 552-554.

Ertel claims to have brought

Horn's mental condition to the attention of Horn's superiors.

R. 554.

68.

Townsend warned Mr. Horn to work things out with Squire. R.

69.

Mr. Horn recalls being asked by Townsend if he had knowledge

606.

which could in effect bring the state to its knees.

Mr. Horn

remembers this question in the context of discussion regarding
another employee. Mr. Horn contends that Townsend posed the question
regarding the integrity of the system.
-20-

R. 515.

70.

Townsend recalls the discussion regarding "bringing the

state to its knees" differently.

According to Townsend, Mr. Hom made

a comment about having knowledge to bring the state to its knees
completely out of the blue.
71.

R. 614.

After the meeting between Mr. Hom and Townsend, Townsend

did not take the comments allegedly made by Mr. Hom seriously because
Mr. Hom had been so distressed during the conversation.
72.

R. 607-608.

Despite Townsend's beliefs and observations regarding Mr.

Horn's mental state, he did not make a referral for counseling or help
for Mr. Hom.
73.

R. 618.

Bodrero also noticed a change in Mr. Horn's behavior.

586-588.

R.

Bodrero, likewise, did not recommend that Mr. Hom utilize

the employee assistance program.

Bodrero believed that Mr. Hom had

been offered help but that Mr. Hom had refused the help.
75.

R. 588.

Bodrero claims that he did not give an order restricting

any of Mr. Horn's accesses to the state computer system.

R. 589.

Bodrero does not know if Townsend attempted to corroborate or confirm
anything regarding the security risk issue prior to Mr. Hom being
restricted.
76.
under

R. 590.

Following his termination, Mr. Hom exercised his rights

the

grievance.

Utah

State

Personnel

Management

Act

and

pursued

a

Although Mr. Horn's grievance was ultimately dismissed for

failure to prosecute, this dismissal occurred while Mr. Horn's
§ 1983 lawsuit was pending before the United States District Court.
R. 499-517.
77.

Prior to filing his federal lawsuit, Mr. Hom duly filed his

Notice of Claim on September 26, 1990.

R. 1087-1111.

The State of

Utah acknowledged receipt of Mr. Horn's Notice of Claim and denied Mr.
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Horn's claim on November 5, 1990.
78.

R. 1086.

Mr. Horn was diligent in the prosecution of his case before

the United States District Court.

During the course of discovery,

Mr. Horn became aware of facts surrounding his termination which would
support a claim for handicap discrimination under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.

29 U.S.C. §§ 701

et

seq.

It was not until the

depositions of Roland Squire, Arthur Hudachko, Richard Townsend,
Cherie Ertel and Douglas Bodrero were taken that Mr. Horn became aware
of facts supporting a claim for handicap discrimination.

Prior to

these depositions, Mr. Horn was totally unaware that he was perceived
by the Appellees and others as having mental and emotional problems.
There had been absolutely no inkling that this perception was a
motivating

factor

in

his

dismissal.

R.

363,

494-498.

These

depositions took place on July 12, 1994 (Bodrero); July 14, 1994
(Ertel and Townsend); and August 5, 1994 (Hudachko).
79.
of

a

R. 414.

After Mr. Horn's counsel had learned of the facts supportive

claim

for

handicap

discrimination

and

after

thoughtfully

considering their implications, Mr. Horn chose to file a motion to
amend his complaint with the United States District Court to include
a

claim

for

perceived

Rehabilitation Act.
been enacted.
80.

handicap

discrimination

under

the

The American's with Disabilities Act had not yet

R. 499-517.

The United States District Court ultimately denied Mr.

Horn's motion seeking leave to amend his complaint to add a claim for
perceived handicap discrimination.

R. 417-419.

The motion seeking

leave to amend was denied on the grounds that it was too close to the
trial date to allow such an amendment as it would be prejudicial to
the Defendants in that case.

The United State District Court did not
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decide the merits of the perceived handicap discrimination claim.
Nor did the United States District Court rule that the discovery rule
did not apply under the facts of the case pending before it.

R.418-

419.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when it ruled that the nature of the
employment

relationship

between

Mr. Horn and

statutory rather than contractual.
public

employee

was

defined

by

the Department

was

While Mr. Horn's status as a

statute,

the

character

of

his

employment relationship was based upon written instruments, including
the State Personnel Management Act and its rules and regulations.
Thus, Mr. Horn's claim for breach of his employment contract was
founded

upon a written instrument making the six year statute of

limitations applicable.

Moreover, Utah courts have traditionally

treated the relationship between a public employee and his employer
as contractual.
The trial court also erred when it dismissed Mr. Horn's claim for
perceived handicap discrimination.

The discovery rule should be

applied to toll the statute of limitations.
pursuing his federal lawsuit.

Mr. Horn was diligent in

It was the Appellees, not Mr. Horn, who

were the cause of the delay in discovering the factual basis for the
handicap discrimination

claim.

In addition, until Mr. Horn was

finally able to secure the deposition testimony of certain witnesses,
he had absolutely no idea that one of the motivating factors for
termination was the perception by his employer and others that he was
handicapped.
supporting

Because the Appellees actively concealed the facts

the handicap discrimination

claim

from Mr. Horn, they

should be estopped from defending against the claim on the basis of
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the running of the limitations period.

Moreover, because of the

exceptional circumstances of this case, it would be unjust not to
toll

the

statute

of

limitations. Mr.

Horn's claim

for

handicap

discrimination is meritorious.
Finally, the trial court erred when it dismissed Mr. Horn's claim
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Because Mr. Horn's breach of contract claim is founded on a written
instrument, his breach of the implied covenant claim is valid and is
covered by the same limitations period as the breach of contract
claim.
ARGUMENT
The granting of the Appellees' motion for summary judgment led
to the dismissal of Mr. Horn's complaint against the Appellees in the
trial court,

""in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we review

the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.'"
America,

Glover

v.

Boy Scouts

923 P. 2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996) (quoting Harline

of
Barker,

v.

912 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted)). The court should
"construe the evidentiary material submitted on the motion and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable
Thurston

to the party opposing the motion."

v. Box Elder

P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).

County,

835

Moreover, "[s]ummary

judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."

K&T,

Inc.

v.

(citations omitted));
summary

judgment

review[s]

the

Koroulis,
UTAH

presents

trial

888 P. 2d 623, 626-27

R.

only

court's

P. 56(c).

CIV.

questions

determinations
-24-

(Utah 1994)

Finally,
of

law,

under

"[b]ecause

[the

court]

a standard

of

correctness,

according

no deference

Maoris & Associates,

conclusions."

to

Inc.

the

trial

v. Images

court's

& Attitude,

941 P. 2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted);
v.

First

Security

Leasing

(citations omitted).

Co.,

844

P.2d

legal

303,

306

Inc.,
Sanderson

(Utah

1992)

Here, the Court of Appeals should reverse the

trial court's decision to grant summary judgment against Mr. Horn.
I.

BECAUSE MR. HOM'S EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE OF
UTAH IS CONTRACTUAL RATHER THAN STATUTORY, THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED ERROR BY DISMISSING HIS BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM.
A.

The Nature Of The Employment Relationship Between The
Parties Is Contractual. Not Statutory.

The trial court erred by dismissing Mr. Horn's breach of contract
claim on the basis that Mr. Horn's employment relationship with the
Department was statutory and not contractual.

This is a premise

which is not supported by fact or law. Whether a public employees
relationship with his employer is statutory rather than contractual
is an issue of first impression in Utah.

Mr. Horn was a public

employee pursuant to contractual terms and conditions which were
often fleshed out by legislative enactment.

Mr. Horn's employment

relationship with the Department was governed by a written contract.
Thus, the six year statute of limitations is applicable, rather than
the three year statute of limitations relied upon by the trial court2.
Mr. Horn was employed pursuant to a written contract whose terms
and

conditions

pursuant

to

a

were

provided

contract

whose

by

statute3. Mr. Horn was

express

terms

and

employed

conditions

See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-12-26 (three years for actions arising out of liabilitycreated by the statutes of this state) and 78-12-23 (six years for actions founded upon
an instrument in writing).
3
There is no question that Mr. Horn was a "public employee*1 and not a "public
official."
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are

supplied by statutory and regulative sources.
employee is created by statute.
Horn and his employer

Mr. Horn's status as an

But, the relationship between Mr.

is contractual with the precise

terms and

conditions of that contractual relationship being found in various
sources

including

the Department

of Human

Resources

Management

("DHRM") Rules and Regulations4.
Prior to the enactment of the State Personnel Management Act
(the "Management Act"), the relationship between the State, as an
employer, and its employees was contractual.
similar

to the nature of the employment

private employer and its employees.
Act

did not change

Management
individuals

Act

employed

added

relationship

between a

The enactment of the Management

the character

simply

This relationship was

a

of

layer

that
of

relationship.
protection

by the State5. The Management

to

The
those

Act created

uniformity, but it did not change the underlying basic contractual
relationship between the State and its employees.

The contractual

relationship between Mr. Horn and the Department in this case is
premised upon well established common law foundation of contractual
relations between and employer and his employees, long recognized by
Utah courts.

For example, in Piacitelli

v. Southern

Utah State

College,

636

P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court found that the terms
and

conditions

See State
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE,

of Piacitelli's

Personnel

employment

Management Act,

were

governed

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-16-1 et seq.

by the

and UTAH

R477.

5

See e.g. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992) (if the
employer's actions were allowed to nullify the requirements of the statutory state law,
such action would "leav[e] employees subject to arbitrary treatment by their
superiors.")
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College's Personnel Manual6. Thus, the Court reasoned that they were
"construing a contract, not declaring statutory or constitutional
Id.

rights."

Like the employer college in Piacitelli,

here, the employer

Department chose to promulgate rules and regulations governing its
employment relationship with its employees, including Mr. Horn.

In

essence, the statutes and regulations adopted by the State of Utah
constitute its employment manual.

Because the State of Utah has

chosen to establish and mandate these rules and regulations, it has
undertaken certain contractual obligations, not the least of which is
it cannot fire its employees without just cause.

It should not make

a difference that the State of Utah, as an employer, must so act
through

legislative

enactment.

UTAH

CODE

ANN.

§

67-19-18.

In

addition, the rules and regulations promulgated by the State of Utah
make numerous references to contracts and agreements between the
employer and the employee.

See

R. at 620.

Thus, the existence of

the statutes and regulations governing the terms and conditions of
Mr. Horn's employment are not mutually exclusive from that employment.
Rather, they create the express terms and conditions of Mr. Horn's
employment.

These express terms and conditions were agreed to by Mr.

Horn when he accepted his employment with the Department.

Mr. Horn's

employment relationship with the Department was contractual despite
the fact that the terms which he seeks to enforce are subject to

The Court went on to note:"[t]his finding comports with the numerous holdings
that an educational institution may undertake a contractual
obligation to observe
particular termination formalities by adopting procedures or by promulgating rules and
regulations governing the employment relationship." Id. at 1066 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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legislative change.7

This is classic example of a unilateral

contract. See

v.

Anderson

(Iowa 1995); Thorn

Douglas

v. Bloomfield

& Lomason

Hills

Board

230 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Manning v. City
874 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Geraghty

v.

Auth.,

Health

and Rehabilitative

v.

of Hazel

v.

of

513 N.W.2d

Park,

509 N.W.2d

Berkeley

Bay County

Heights,
Metropolitan

707 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Mich. 1989); Department
Services

App. 1988); Ness v. Glasscock,
Bennett

540 N.W. 2d 277

of Education,

Township

613 A.2d 497 (N.J. Super. 1990); Merrell

Trans.

Co.,

Marshall

Public

v.

Boyd,

of

525 So.2d 432 (Fla. Ct.

781 P.2d 137 (Co. Ct. App. 1989); and
Library,

746 F. Supp. 671

(W.D. Mich.

1990).
Another example of the public employee/employer relationship
being treated as contractual can be found in Thurston
County,

892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995) (Thurston

employee, a former county (i.e.

II).

v. Box

Elder

In Thurston,

the

public) employee, sought relief for

a breach of employment contract with regard to a reduction in force.
The trial court granted summary judgment against Mr. Thurston.8

On

appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the County had not properly
considered the statutory guidelines when creating its Manual as
mandated by state law. Because the County had failed to comply with
the statutory guidelines in formulating the contractual relationship

As is the case with any employer's employment manual. "The existence of such a
contractual obligation does not preclude an employer's changing current procedures and
regulations according to existing practices and procedures for amendment. Thus, it has
been held that an employer's policy manual may give rise t o employee contractual rights
even where it "can be unilaterally amended by the employerwithout notice to the
employee." Toussaint
v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 615, 292 M.W.2d
880,892 (1980) (non-educational employer). See also,
Knowles v. Unity College,
Me. 429
A.2d 220 (1981). Piacitelli
v. Southern
Utah State
College,
636 P.2d at n.5.
g
The County argued that it had properly applied the provisions of its Manual in
selecting Mr. Thurston as a candidate for termination pursuant to the reduction in
force.
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between it and its employees, the case was remanded
Id.

consideration.

for further

at 170.

On remand, the trial court "ruled that the Act governed the
dispute and that the County had improperly considered factors beyond
those enumerated in the Act in terminating Thurston.

On that basis,

the court held that the County had violated Thurston's due process
Thurston

rights and breached its employment contract with Thurston."
II,

892 P. 2d at 1035-36.

conclusion.

Id.

at 1039.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed

Finally, in Thurston

II,

that

the Utah Supreme

Court pointedly found that
Thurston's action is not based upon any statutory violation for
which reinstatement is a prescribed remedy. Accordingly, the
cases based upon statutory violations which Thurston cites are
not persuasive on the appropriate remedy for his breach of
contract action.9 As stated above, an order for reinstatement
is permissible in a breach of employment contract action as an
equitable remedy when damages are inadequate or unascertainable.
Id.

at 1042.

Thus, the highest court of this state has recognized

and

accepted

the

relationship

fundamental

between

a

principle

public

that

employee

the

and

nature

his

of

the

employer

is

contractual; not statutory.
As in Thurston,

here, Mr. Horn is seeking relief for the breach

of the employment contract with the Department.

Also, like Box Elder

County, here, the State of Utah was required to and did promulgate
rules and regulations governing the employment relationship with its
employees.

See

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

UTAH CODE ANN.

R477.

§ 67-19-6

(1953), as

amended;

UTAH

In addition, like the employment relationship

"As we noted in Thurston I, this case was brought as an action for breach of an
employment contract, not as a request for judicial review of Thurston's grievance
appeal. The termination of remedies in a review of administrative appeals is not based
upon the same legal principles as those used to determine remedies in breach of contract
actions." Thurston II, 892 P.2d at n. 3.
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in Thurston,

here the terms and conditions of Mr. Horn's employment

were created by the Department of Human Resource Management rules and
regulations, i.e. the manual, and by statute.

The governing state

statute in each case defines and establishes the basic terms and
conditions of employment for merit covered employees.

However, this

does not make the relationship statutory in nature.
Finally, the nature of the employment relationship can also be
gleaned from an examination of cases dealing with public employee
pension plans.

Retirement

In Newcomb

Commission,

v.

Ogden

City

Public

School

Teachers*

243 P. 2d 941 (Utah 1952), the Utah Supreme

Court recognized that a public employee's employment is a creature of
contract whose terms are supplied by, and from time-to-time, modified
by legislative enactments. As part of its analysis of the nature of
a public employee's claim to enforcement of previously created
retirement promises, the court stated:
The statute or ordinance becomes a part of the employee's
contract of employment as though actually incorporated
therein and the right to a pension becomes as much a part
of the agreed compensation for the services of the employee
as the monthly stipend, but it is deferred in payment until
after his retirement
With the acceptance by the plaintiffs of the
defendant's offer, a contract was made which precluded the
defendant from afterwards reducing in amount the pension to
which the plaintiff became entitled for life, . . . even
though the grantor of the pension was the state and not a
private corporation ....
Id.

at 944.
There is no basis to distinguish the Newcomb decision from the

facts of Mr. Horn's case. Both instances involve the incorporation of
a statutory obligation into the employment relationship between a
public employee and a public employer.
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In both cases the employer's

statutory

obligation

is

read

into

the

contractual

employment

relationship so as to provide an essential term of that contract.

In

both cases the power of the legislature to make necessary adjustments
to the statute being read into the contract is recognized10.

Clearly,

if one Utah public employee has a contractual right to enforce the
terms of the employment relationship supplied by statute, another
should as well.

It is inconsistent and illogical to argue that a

statutory entitlement to a pension is qualitatively different that a
statutory entitlement to "just cause" termination.
illogical

to claim

that

statutorily

created

It is equally

pension

rights

are

contractual in the nature of their enforcement but the right to "just
cause" termination is not11. The principle should likewise be applied
to the present case.12

B.

Because Mr. Horn's Employment Contract With The
Department Is Founded Upon A Written Instrument, The
Applicable Statute Qf Limitations Is Six Years,

The trial court erred when it held that Mr. Horn's claim was

The Newcomb court continued, "as pensions granted to employees of the state or its
municipalities are purely of statutory origin, the employees, in making contracts of
employment under which the right to participate in the pension fund accrues, do so in
contemplation of the reserved right of the Legislature to amend or to repeal the laws on
which the pension systems are founded; and therefore the right to participate in the
fund, even though arising from the contract, is based upon the anticipated continuance
of existing laws." Id. at 946.
The Newcomb court summed it up by stating: "This court in the Driggs case
stated that when a person has accepted an offer of the State or of one of its agencies,
and has met all the conditions thereof, the State or agency is bound to perform the
contract the same as a private person must perform. That principle applies in this
case." Id. at 947.
The theory that the employment relationship between a public employee and his
employer as espoused in Newcomb and Driggs was affirmed in Ellis
v. Utah
State
Retirement
Board, 757 P.2d 8 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Once again, in the context of
public employment, the Courts of this state ruled that: "Utah adheres to the contractual
line of authority
Since Driggs,
... our supreme court has consistently held that
the employee has this vested contractual right ...." See also Yeazell
v. Copins,
402
P.2d 541 (Utah 1965).
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controlled by the three year limitations period rather than the six
year period governing claims founded on written instruments.

In this

case, Mr. Horn is employed pursuant to an express contract. This
express contract is founded

upon several written instruments. ""[I]f

the fact of liability arises or is assumed or imposed from the
instrument itself, or its recitals, the liability is founded upon an
instrument

in

Construction
v.

Realty

writing.'"

Co.,

Brigham

Young

University

v.

744 P. 2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1987) (quoting

Insurance

Co.,

Paulsen

Bracklein

80 P.2d 471, 476 (1938)).

Here, the liability Mr. Horn seeks to have redressed arises out
of the express and written DHRM rules and regulations and the
Management Act.

These constitute the written employment contract

between Mr. Horn and the Department.
instruments.

These constitute written

Thus, the six year limitations period should apply.

Even if the Court were to find that Mr. Horn's claims arise under
both a written instrument and a statutory scheme, the six year
limitations period would apply.

Under Utah law, if an agreement can

be construed as both arising under contract and by statute, the
longer period of limitation applies. Juab
Welfare

v. Summers,

County

Dept.

of

Pub.

426 P. 2d 1 (Utah 1967)13.

Thus, the six year statute of limitations should apply to this

13 u
If the transaction be in doubt as to whether it be one under a written
contract or one created by a statute of this State, generally the one giving the longest
period of limitation is to be preferred. See 1 C.J.S. Actions
§ 46, at page 1102, where
the following language is found: "The action, in the case of doubt, should be construed
to uphold it rather than to defeat it, as the court presumes the pleader's purpose is to
serve his best interest. Accordingly, the action should ordinarily be so construed as to
sustain the complaint if the allegations are sufficient to state a good cause of action
in contract, but not in tort, or vice versa; and so as to sustain the jurisdiction if
the court would have jurisdiction of the action in one form but not in the other; and so
as to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if the action would be barred in one
form but not the other." [Emphasis added.] Id. at 3.
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case.

Moreover, under Utah case law, the three-year statute of

limitations imposed by UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 78-12-26 is restricted mainly

to situations involving claims involving workman's compensation or
unemployment compensation.

Both of which are statutorily created

remedial schemes for which no alternative remedy exists.

There are

no reported cases in which a claim similar to that asserted by Mr.
Horn has been subjected to the three-year period of limitations. To
do so in this case would be contrary to the mandates of Utah law.
Under Utah law a contract claim based upon a written policy or
bylaw is subject to the six-year period of limitations found in UTAH
CODE ANN.

Farmers

§ 78-12-23.

In State

of Utah

ex rel Baker

v.

Intermountain

Association,

668 P.2d 503 (Utah 1983) the court stated that

an obligation created by a bylaw of IFA was subject to a six-year
statute

of limitation.

Associationf
founded

See also

Ward

907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995).

upon a written instrument.

v.

Intermountain

Farmers

This is because the claim was

As such, it was entitled to the

six year statute of limitations.

Here, Mr. Horn's contract claim is

founded upon written instruments.

As such, he too is entitled to the

protections of the six year statute of limitations.
The contested portions of Mr. Horn's contract consist of the
written provisions found in DHRM regulations and state statute. Mr.
Horn has not alleged that his employment was covered by an "implied in
law"

contract

termination.
distinction
Intermountain

on the issue

of his right

to a

"just

cause"

Mr. Horn's contract is express and it is written. The
is made

clear

Theatres,

Inc.,

in Woodland

Theatres,

Inc.

560 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977).

v. ABC

"An implied

covenant must rest entirely on the presumed intention of the parties
as gathered

from the terms as actually expressed
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in the written

instrument itself, . ..."

Id.

at 703.

Thus, we are not dealing with

an implied contractual term in this case.

We are dealing with an

express, written contract consisting of several documents.

Wherever

possible, multiple writings must be considered together when part of
the same contract.

Verhoef

App. 1987); Nish Noroian

v. Aston,

740 P. 2d 1342, 1344 (Utah Ct.

Farms v. Agricultural

611 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 1984); HCA Health
St.

Mark's

Charities,

an

agreement

Labor Relations
Services

of Utah,

846 P.2d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

between

parties

is

contained

in

more

Bd.,
Inc.

v.

Also, when
than

one

instrument, those instruments must be construed together as though
they

comprise

a single

Forster,

650 P.2d

Services

of Utah,

document.

1315, 1318

Inc.

v. St.

Chambliss/Jenkins

(Colo. Ct. App. 1982);

Mark's

Charities,

Assocs.
HCA

v.
Health

846 P. 2d 476 (Utah

Ct. App. 1993).
Because Utah courts have construed the employment relationship
between a public employee and his employer as contractual, the trial
court committed error when it found otherwise.

The Management Act

does not make Mr. Horn's relationship with the Department
statutory.

solely

Rather, the Management Act simply defines Mr. Horn's

status as a public employee.

Further, the Management Act provides

the mandate that the written employment contract, in the form of
rules and regulations must be established. Thus, Mr. Horn's claims
arise out of a written

instrument

and

the six year statute of

limitations should apply.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IS DISMISSING MR. HOM f S PERCEIVED
HANDICAP
DISCRIMINATION
CLAIM
UNDER
§504
OF
THE
REHABILITATION ACT.
A.

Because The Discovery Rule Applies To The Facts Of
This Case, The Statute Of Limitations Was Tolled And
-34-

Mr. Horn's
Asserted,

Rehabilitation

Act

Claim

Was

Timely

Mr. Horn sought to amend his verified complaint to add a claim
for discrimination on the basis of a perceived handicap pursuant to
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

29 U.S.C. §§ 701

seq.

perceived

The

factual

basis

for

Mr.

Horn's

et

handicap

discrimination claim was uncovered late in the course of pre-trial
discovery during his federal lawsuit.

Mr. Horn did not become aware

of the factual basis for a perceived handicap discrimination claim
until

he

had

secured

the

depositions

of

Roland

Squire,

Arthur

Hudachko, Richard Townsend, Cherie Ertel and Douglas Bodrero.
depositions were secured in July and August 1994.

These

In this case, Mr.

Horn was prevented from learning the facts supporting a claim for
perceived
during

handicap

the

discrimination

discovery

process

until

in

Mr.

the

facts were

Horn's

federal

revealed
lawsuit.

Appellees' perception of Mr. Horn was never admitted in pleadings or
discovery until disclosed under questioning by Mr. Horn's counsel.
Thus, the "discovery rule" should apply to prevent the running of the
applicable four year statute of limitations.
In Utah, "[w]hether the discovery

rule applies to toll the

statute of limitations is a question of law[.]"
Title

Co.,

Kightly,

Sevy

v.

Security

857 P.2d 958, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Klinger
791 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1990)).

v.

The general rule is that

"the limitation period begins to run when the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action occurs.
exception

to

the

general

rule,

it

The discovery
delays

the

rule is an

running

of

the

limitation period until discovery of facts forming the basis for the

cause of action."

Sevy

v. Security
-35-

Title

Co. of So.

Utah,

902 P. 2d

629, 634 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted)

Thus, "the discovery rule

operates to extend the time from which the limitations period begins
to run."

Anderson

v.

Dean Witter

Reynolds,

(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citing Walker
P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995)).

Inc.,

Drug Co.

v.

920 P.2d 575, 578
La Sal

Oil

Co.,

902

"If the discovery rule applies, the

applicable statute of limitations is held to have commenced running
only at the time the plaintiff first knew or should have known of the
facts giving rise to the cause of action."
(citations omitted).

Anderson,

920 P.2d at 578

It is Mr. Horn's contention that the discovery

rule does apply in this case.
There are three situations in which the discovery rule applies:
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by
statute; (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become
aware of the cause of action because of the defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where
the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application
of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of
any showing that the defendant has prevented the discovery of
the cause of action.
Anderson,
Rightly,

920 P. 2d at 578

(citation omitted); accord

791 P.2d 868, 872 (Utah 1990); Myers

v.

McDonald,

Klinger

v.

635 P.2d

84, 86 (Utah 1981 )).
In this case the discovery rule should be applied pursuant to
the second and/or third situation.

In the present case, Mr. Horn did

not know, nor could he have known that one of the motivations for his
termination was the perception of his employer and others that he had
a mental handicap.

When Mr. Horn was terminated he was told that he

was being terminated for three reasons, none of which would have led
him

to

pursue

a

handicap

discrimination

claim.

In

fact,

the

Appellees would have been foolish to apprise Mr. Horn of this reason
for his termination as it would have subjected them to liability for
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handicap

discrimination.

Thus,

they

concealed

this

motivating

factor.

It was not until Mr. Horn had the opportunity to take the

depositions of critical witnesses in his federal case that he learned
that there was a perception that he was handicapped.
Here two of the three circumstances

are applicable. First,

pursuant to the "concealment" circumstance exception of the discovery
rule, a defendant who misleads a plaintiff or "causes a delay in the
bringing of a cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute
of limitations as a defense to the action."
838 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Utah 1992) 14 .

Corp.,

demonstrate that he acted reasonably

Warren

v.

Provo

City

Thus, the plaintiff must

in not bringing the action

during the limitations period.
Early

in

the

interrogatories,
reasons

for

course

asked

terminating

of

the

litigation,

the defendants
Mr.

Horn from

Mr.

to disclose
his

Horn,
all

employment

through
of

their

with

the

Department, both those disclosed to Mr. Horn and those withheld from
Mr. Horn.

In their response, Appellees did not indicate that they

perceived the Mr. Horn as being mentally and/or emotionally disabled.
Mr. Horn was completely unaware that the Appellees perceived him as
having

a handicap and that this perception was a basis for his

termination.

Discovery continued and finally during the course of

deposition testimony of certain of the Appellees and several of their
witnesses, Mr. Horn learned that he had been perceived as handicapped
by Appellees.

Thus, until the deposition testimony secured in the

late summer of 1994, Mr. Horn was completely in the dark about certain

The concealment circumstance exception of the discovery rule "is essentially a
form of equitable estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in the bringing of a
cause of action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to
the action." Warren v. Provo City Corp.,
838 P.2d at 1130 (footnote omitted).
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facts surrounding his wrongful termination.

Because this knowledge

was solely within the control and province of the Appellees, there
was absolutely no way that Mr. Horn could have known of the Appellees'
discriminatory

motives

behind

his termination

and there was

absolutely no way that a reasonable plaintiff in good faith could
have brought suit within the statutory period.
Mr. Horn took reasonable steps to determine his causes of action
against the Appellees for his wrongful termination.
lawsuit, Mr. Horn sent out discovery requests.

In his federal

It took the defendants

in that case, all of whom are Appellees herein, more than two years
to file their responses.
an

answer

In addition, it took them two years to file

to Mr. Horn's federal complaint.

Mr. Horn sought the

assistance of the federal court on numerous occasions.
said that Mr. Horn was not diligent.

It cannot be

Mr. Horn needed the responses to

his discovery requests before he could thoughtfully and carefully
depose Ertel, Bodrero, Hudachko, Squire and Townsend.

The delay in

finally learning of this illegal reason for his termination lies
squarely on the shoulders of the Appellees.

A copy of the Docket in

the federal case is attached as part of the Addendum to this Brief.
It indicates that the Appellees were to blame for any delay in Mr.
Horn taking the depositions of the critical witnesses.
Second,

the "exceptional

circumstances"

exception

of the

discovery rule also applies to toll the statute of limitations in
this case.
apply,

In order for the exceptional circumstances exception to

"the plaintiff must make an

initial

showing1

that

the

plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have known of the
existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the
limitation period. !ff

Sevy v. Security
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Title

Co., 857 P.2d 958, 962

(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Warren

v.

Provo

City

Corp.,

838 P.2d

1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)).
There were no facts or indications during the statutory period
which would have apprised Mr. Horn that he had been discriminated
against

based

on

a

perceived

handicap.

Thus,

the

"threshold

requirement11 that Mr. Horn show that he did not know and could not
have

known

of

the

existence

of

the

cause

of

action

until

the

established,

"then

the

limitations period lapsed, has been satisfied.
Once

the

threshold

requirement

is

reviewing court moves to the balancing test.

The balancing test is

[t]he ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional
circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations
irrational or unjust ....'"
838 P.2d at 1129).

Sevy,

Warren,

857 P.2d at 963 (quoting

"[I]n applying the balancing test a court will

balance the hardship the statute of limitations would impose on the
plaintiff

against any prejudice

to the defendant

difficulties of proof caused by the passage of time."

resulting
Sevy,

from

857 P.2d

at 963 (citations omitted).
Here the balancing test weighs in favor of tolling the statute
of limitations.

First, the Appellees have prevented Mr. Horn from

learning that he was perceived as handicapped by the Appellees.

The

Appellees have discriminated against Mr. Horn in violation of federal
statutory law.

If the trial court's decision is allowed to stand,

then the Appellees will have succeeded in avoiding the consequences
of their blatant discrimination.
his

claim

for

violation

of

If Mr. Horn is not allowed to pursue
his

rights

as

guaranteed

by

the

Rehabilitation Act, a message is sent to the Appellees that they can
discriminate and get away with it as long as they conceal certain
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facts and refuse to reveal them until the applicable statute of
limitations has passed.
Second,
Appellees.

there

During

are
the

no

significant

depositions

brought to the fore that Mr. Horn
and/or emotional disability.

their

depositions.

previously

of

proof

mentioned,

it

for
was

was perceived as having a mental

Thus, the evidence and proof is still

fresh in the Appellees memory.15
in

problems

And if not, it has been memorialized

Moreover,

because

Mr.

Horn's

handicap

discrimination claim is based on "perception11, it is not necessary
for the Appellees to engage an expert to evaluate Mr. Horn's mental
state then existing mental state, unless of course Appellees want to
prove that Mr. Horn was in fact handicapped.
Horn's

claim

is

based

on

the

perception

additional discovery is necessary.

In addition, because Mr,
of

the

Appellees,

no

Thus, there is little, if any,

inequity that will result to the Appellees if the discovery rule is
applied.
B.

Mr. Horn's Rehabilitation Act Claim Is Not Barred By
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel.

The facts of this case do not support the conclusion of the
trial court that Mr. Horn may be collaterally estopped from asserting
his claim for perceived handicap discrimination under § 504 of the

In Sevy v. Security
Title
Co., 857 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Court stated
that if the balancing test had been applied to the facts in the Sevy case, such
application would create significant problems of proof for the defendant because the key
witness had "no memory of the critical facts." Id. at 964 (emphasis in original). In
the present case, defendants and their key witnesses all have memory of their
perceptions of plaintiff's mental and emotional state. Thus, the balance is in
plaintiff's favor and the statute of limitations should be tolled to allow Mr. Horn to
state his claim for handicap discrimination.
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seq.16

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et
estoppel,

also

referred

to

as

issues

"Collateral

preclusion,

prevents

relitigation of issues raised, litigated, and resolved in a previous
action."
P.2d

Maoris

636, 639

& Associates,

Inc.

(Utah Ct. App.

v.

Images

1997).

At

& Attitude,
the

Inc.,

trial

Appellees sought the application of collateral estoppel.

941

court, the
In order to

do so, it was necessary for them to establish four elements:
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the previous
action and in the case at hand. Second, the issue must have
been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous
action. Third, the issue must have been competently, fully, and
fairly litigated in the previous action.
Fourth, the party
against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in the current
action must have been either a party or privy to a party in the
previous action.
Id.

(quoting Jones,

Waldo,

Holbrook

1370 (Utah 1996)); Sevy

1366,

(Utah 1995).

Security

v.

Title

Dawson,
Co.,

923 P.2d

902 P.2d 629

The party who raises the defense of collateral estoppel

has the burden of proof.
1993).

v.

& McDonough

Timm v.

Dewsnup,

851 P. 2d 1178, 1184 (Utah

The Appellees failed to prove the existence of all four

collateral estoppel requirements and the trial court committed error
when it concluded that collateral estoppel applied to prevent Mr. Horn
from maintaining his perceived handicap discrimination claim.
Because

the

Appellees

did

not

establish

the

first

two

requirements of collateral estoppel, the trial court committed error
in ruling that Mr. Horn's perceived handicap discrimination claim was

While not included in the actual order prepared by Appellees' trial counsel and
entered by the Court, the Court noted in its ruling from the bench that the collateral
estoppel doctrine may apply. R. at 1123.
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barred by collateral estoppel from relating back .
Initially, Mr. Horn's motion seeking leave to amend his complaint
in the federal court was denied on the basis that the motion
untimely

was

in that trial was two months away and would therefore be

prejudicial to the defendants in that case.
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Horn v.

(10th

federal

Cir.

1996).

Second,

the

This was affirmed by the
Squire,
court

81 F.3d
decision

969, 973
did

not

consider or reach the issue of equitable tolling under the "discovery
rule."
The issue decided by the federal court was not identical to the
one

at

hand

due

to

the

absence

in

against the Defendants/Appellees.

this

case

of

undue

prejudice

The primary ground cited by the

federal court for a denial of the motion to amend is not a factor in
thi* oiiii
refusal

of

H«na«, th«r« ia no identity of lisuns,
the

federal

court

to consider

the

issue

Moreover, the
of

equitable

tolling under the "discovery rule" restricted its ruling on the issue
of

"relation back" to the extent that the issue is different

that presented in this case18.

than

In other words, had the federal court

ruled that the discovery rule did not or could not apply to the facts
presented, and if the federal court had not disposed of the issue
pursuant to facts that do not exist in the present case, there would
have been issue identity.

Similarly, the federal court

expressly

While Mr. Horn did seek approval from the United States District Court, pursuant
to FED. R. CIV. P. 15 to amend his federal complaint to add a claim for handicap
discrimination, the issue was not decided in such a way as to preclude the issue from
consideration by the trial court.
18
"The court expressly declines to rule in the present context on the law concerning
accrual and tolling of causes of action and how the law may or may not affect the
validity of a handicap discrimination claim under the controlling statute of
limitations. The present posture of the case does not present facts upon which to make
such a ruling." R. 419.
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declined to rule on the applicability of the "discovery rule" with
regard to Mr. Horn's motion to amend, primarily because of the short
time remaining before the trial date.

Thus, the issue of "relation

back" was not decided in a final adjudication on the merits.
Mr. Horn maintains that under Utah law, as illustrated in the
Selvage

case, supra,

the full scope of the issue in the present case

includes a determination on the merits of whether the "discovery
rule" should apply.

If the discovery rule does apply, then the

running of the statute of limitation is tolled until such time as the
discovery is made.

Sevy

v. Security

Title

629, 634 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted).

Co. of

So.

Utah,

902 P. 2d

Without a determination of

that portion of the issue at hand, there cannot be an accurate
decision on the sub-issue of Rule 15(c) relation back.

Further,

because the federal court skirted around the discovery rule issue, it
gave an incomplete and qualitatively different decision on the issue
of Rule 15(c) relation back.

In sum, because of the overbearing

weight of the undue prejudice issue caused by the imminent trial
date, the federal court essentially decided a wholly different issue
than the one presented in this case.
C.

Mr, Horn's Perceived Handicap Discrimination Claim Is
Meritorious And Should Be Considered By The Trial
Court.

The depositions of three individuals, each a Defendant in this
case, demonstrate that the Appellees perceived Mr. Horn as being
mentally handicapped19.

Douglas Bodrero, the Appellee who made the ultimate decision to terminate Mr.
Horn's employment, gave his deposition on July 12, 1994. Arthur Hudachko, one of Mr.
Horn's direct supervisors, gave his deposition on August 5, 1994. Richard Townsend, who
authored a memorandum accusing Mr. Horn of being a security risk, gave his deposition on
July 14, 1994.
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Mr.

Horn was

never

informed

that

any

action,

adverse

or

otherwise, was taken against him because of a perceived handicap.

In

fact, the Appellees were careful to prevent Mr. Horn from learning
that this was one of the motivations for his termination.

To do

otherwise would have been a direct admission that the law had been
broken.
short,

Mr. Horn never considered himself to be handicapped.

In

there was no basis from which to learn that a perceived

handicap had played any part in the decision to terminate Mr. Horn
until mid-July 1994.
Prior to 1988, Mr. Horn had a very successful career with the
Department. During his involvement with the RFP committee, Mr. Horn
did two things which are important to this case: (1) he nearly worked
himself to death trying to keep up with the demands of his job and
the added responsibilities of the RFP committee work; and (2) he
spoke out against what he perceived to be violations of Utah law
dealing with the procurement process.

When Mr. Horn saw that his

admonitions about the law being violated were being ignored and
causing him to be retaliated against rather than appreciated for his
dedication, he decided to file a grievance for the unpaid overtime he
had put in on the RFP committee work.
Horn's career took a nose dive.
his favor in late 1988.

From that point forward, Mr.

Mr. Horn's grievance was resolved in

Within one year, by November 1989, Mr. Horn

was being fired.
Mr. Horn challenged the illegal firing for the reasons which were
apparent to him.

However, during the course of discovery in his

federal case, it became clear that his employer, his supervisors, and
some of his co-workers perceived him as being emotionally or mentally
handicapped.

It

also

became

clear
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that

these

people

saw

his

emotional and mental state deteriorate during the time he worked on
the RFP committee.

They saw a cause and effect relationship based on

a "before and after" comparison of Mr. Horn's demeanor.
It also became clear during discovery in the federal case that
the Appellees had programs intended and designed specifically to
address such perceived problems.

The Department, like any other Utah

State government entity, has an Employee Assistance Program which can
be used to deal with stress related employment issues.

This program

has been used with other employees who were perceived as suffering
from emotional overload in the past.

In addition, the Department has

a "fitness for duty" procedure which had also been used in the past
to determine if an employee was emotionally, mentally, or physically
able to do his or her job.
Despite

the

congruence

of

perception

that

Mr.

Horn was

handicapped and the availability of programs and procedures to deal
with such a problem, the Appellees chose not to give Mr. Horn the
protections he was entitled to under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
20

The Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") became law on July
26,

1992.

Mr. Horn was fired

in 1990.

Prior

to the ADA, the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Act") covered handicap discrimination.
The Act "prohibits programs receiving federal financial assistance
from discriminating against handicapped persons solely because of
that handicap."

Welsh

v.

City

of

Tulsa,

1417 (10th Cir. 1992) (footnote omitted).

Oklahoma,

977 F.2d 1415,

There should be little

Specifically, Hudachko, Townsend, Bodrero and Ertel stated that they perceived Mr.
Horn as being handicapped. R. 524, 525-26, 527, 528, 519-23, 537, 538, 553, 554, 586,
587, 588, 606, 615-16, 618, 619.
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question that a state police agency is an entity receiving federal
financial assistance, making it subject to the mandates of the Act.
Henning

v.

Village

of

Mayfield,

610 F. Supp. 17 (N.D.Ohio

1985)

(finding that a police agency which receives federal funding renders
the entire municipality subject to the mandate of the Rehabilitation
Act).

Moreover, according to 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f), any state or

political subdivisions such a recipient.
Mr. Horn also must demonstrate that he is handicapped.

Under the

Act, a handicapped person is defined as a person who "(I) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits on or more
of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is

regarded

as having

U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (emphasis added).

such

an impairment."

29

""Major life activities'

means "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.'" Welsh

v.

City

C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)).

of

Tulsa,

977 F.2d at 1417 (quoting 45

It is Mr. Horn's contention that he was

discriminated against because the Appellees regarded him as having a
mental impairment which substantially limited his ability to work,
not only as a computer programmer, but in any capacity as an employee
at all.
Based on the evidence, Mr. Horn asserted a prima facie case of
handicap discrimination under the Act: (1) he was perceived as being
a handicapped person, as the term is defined under the Act; (2) he
was otherwise qualified to perform the duties assigned to him; (3) he
was discriminated against; and (4) the discrimination was because of
the perceived handicap. Mental or emotional illness is recognized as
a handicapping condition.

Doe v. New York University,
-46-

666 F.2d 761

(2d Cir. 1981); Doe v.

Colantti,

454 F. Supp. 621 (E.D.Pa. 1978),

aff'd,

592 F.2d 704 (3rd. Cir. 1979); Doe v. Region

13 Mental

Mental

Retardation

denied,

Comm'n,

704 F.2d 1402, rehearing

Health709 F.2d

712 (5th Cir. 1983).
It should also be noted, that if a handicapped person, as
defined under the Act, is unable to perform all requirements of a
job, he or she is still "otherwise qualified" and protected if any
"reasonable accommodation" by the employer would enable the employee
to perform those tasks.

School

Board

of Nassau

County

S.Ct. 1123, 1131 n.17 (1987); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k).

v. Arline,

107

Mr. Horn asserts

that there were methods available to provide him with reasonable
accommodation for this perceived handicap which were consciously
ignored by the defendants.
In addition to the Department being liable, here the individual
Appellees were sued in both a personal and representative capacity.

In Association

for Retarded

517 F. Supp. 105

Citizens

in Colorado v. Frazier

et

al.,

(D.C. Colo. 1981) an individual sued in his

representative capacity was held a proper party in a § 504 action.
According to this decision, applying Tenth Circuit precedent, each
individual defendant was a "recipient" within the meaning of the
definition at 45 C.F.R. §84.3(f). See,
University

et

al.,

also Mackey v. Cleveland

837 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1993).

State

Thus, the

individual Appellees are proper defendants in this action.
III. BECAUSE MR. HOM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS EMPLOYER WAS
CONTRACTUAL RATHER THAN STATUTORY, THE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED HIS CLAIM FOR BREACH OF
THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.
Because

the

character

of

the

employment

relationship

is

contractual and not statutory, the trial court committed error when
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it dismissed Mr. Horn's claim for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing21.
A claim based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing gives rise to a claim for breach of contract.
Peterson

v.

Farmers

Browning,

Insurance

832 P. 2d 1280 (Utah 1992) (quoting Beck

Exchange,

701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)).

v.

Mr. Horn

maintains that his public agency employer (and its employees and
agents) retained a power of sole discretion through the express
employment contract discussed above, which obligated them to exercise
that discretion reasonably and in good faith.

Mr. Horn further

maintains that given the circumstances of his termination, the
Appellees acted contrary to a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
and thereby breached the employment contract governing Mr. Horn's
employment. See Cook v.

Zions

Ct. App. 1996); Brehany

v. Nordstrom,

According to McKean v.

First

National

McBride,

Inc.,

Bank,

919 P. 2d 56 (Utah

812 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1991).

884 P. 2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App.

1994), any action based upon a written instrument, as in this case,
can be brought within six years.

In this case, the good faith claim

is based on a specific written contract term which expressly holds
the decision maker to a just cause standard.

There is no basis to

claim that the obligation to apply the just cause standard in good
faith is somehow different in kind than any other provision of the
employment contract.

If any aspect of this contract is subject to

n

[E]very contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith, that implied
covenant 'cannot be construed to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed
upon by the parties.'" Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 308 (Utah
1992) (citation omitted).
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the six-year statute of limitations, all aspects of it are22.
Because the underlying contract in this case is founded upon
written instruments, the applicable statute of limitations is six
years23 Thus, Mr. Horn's good faith and fair dealing was improperly
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based

on

the

foregoing

and

on

the

record

herein, Mr. Hom

respectfully requests that the Court reverse the decision of the
trial court and remand this case back to the trial court where it may
proceed to trial.
DATED AND RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/^*day

of November,

1997.
L. ZANE GILL, P.C.

XL>* Zariefo«p.
Gill
Attorney for Appellant

In City of Terre Haute v. Brighton,
450 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) the
following points are made which apply to the question at hand: (1) firefighters'
relationship with the City is contractual; (2) the fireman's "tenure act" is part of
their contract; (3) the "tenure act" establishes particular requirements for dismissal
or demotion; (4) notwithstanding the statutory remedy provided by the "tenure act", a
common law action in contract is still available; and (5) despite the argument of the
public employer, the limitations period in the City's Tort Claims Act is not applicable.
23
Generally, "a covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in most, if not
all, contractual relationships." St. Benedict's
Dev. v. St. Benedict's
Hospital,
811
P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991) . Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each
party to a contract impliedly promises not to "intentionally or purposely do anything
which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the
contract." Id. at 199. A violation of this covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of
contract. Id. at 200. Whether there has been a breach of contract is generally a
"factual issue to be determined by [the fact finder] after consideration of all
attendant circumstances and evidence...." Western Farm Credit
Bank v. Pratt,
860 P.2d
376, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on November 14, 1997, two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were served, via
first class mail, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Debra J. Moore, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140856
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
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Addendum
29 U.S.C. § 7041 Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and
programs; promulgation of rules and regulations (See Addendum)
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title,
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program
or activity conducted by and Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency
shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the amendments to this section made by the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation
shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of
the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier
than the thirtieth day after the date on which such
regulation is so submitted to such committees.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18 Dismissals and demotions - Grounds Disciplinary action - Procedure - Reductions in force.
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted:
(a) to advance the good of the public interest; or
(b) for just causes such as inefficiency,
incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the
orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance in office.
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex,
age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political
affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including the exercise
of rights under this chapter.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-23 (1953), as amended.
Within six years Mesne profits of real property - Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
(1) for the mesne profits of real property;
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded
upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned
in Section 78-12-22.

§ 78-12-25 (1953), as amended.
Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation or liability not
founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an open
account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any

UTAH CODE ANN.

As it existed at the times relevant to Mr. Horn's termination from his employment at the Department.

article charged on a store account also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of
the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within
four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received;
(3)

for relief not otherwise provided for by law.

§ 78-12-26 (1953), as amended.
Within three years.
An action may be brought within three years.

UTAH CODE ANN.

(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this
state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the
lease of this state, except where in special cases a
different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of
this state;

Proceedings include all events.
2:91cvl016
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Memorandum by A. Roland Squires, Arthur J. Hudachko in
support of [6-1] motion to dismiss with prejudice for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
(tb)

11/15/91 9

Certificate of service by Michael Hom for pltf's
lst/interrogs and req/prod/docs (tb) [Entry date 11/18/91]

12/2/91

10

Motion by Michael Hom to extend time to respond to def's
motion to dismiss (tb) [Entry date 12/03/91]

12/2/91

11

Memorandum by Michael Hom in support of [10-1] motion to
extend time to respond to def's motion to dismiss (tb)
[Entry date 12/03/91]

12/2/91

12

Affidavit of L. Zane Gill (tb) [Entry date 12/03/91]

12/9/91

13

Motion by Michael Hom to amend [1-1] complaint (tb)
[Entry date 12/10/91]

12/9/91

14

Memorandum by Michael Hom in support of [13-1] motion to
amend [1-1] complaint (tb) [Entry date 12/10/91]

12/11/91 15

Memorandum by Michael Hom in opposition to [6-1] motion to
dismiss with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted (tb) [Entry date 12/12/91]
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12/12/91 16

signed by

Order of Reference, pursuant to 28:636(b)(1)(B)
DKW, 12/12/91, ccrattys (tb)

12/13/91 —

Case referred

to Judge Calvin Gould (mw)

12/13/91 17

Notice of Hearing: Motion hearing before CG set for 2:00
1/13/92 for [13-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint (mw)
Stipulation by Michael Horn, A. Roland Squires, Arthur J.
Hudachko stip to continue hrg on Pla's Mot/amd cmplt
previously scheduled for 1/13/92; reset 2/11/92 at 2:00
p.m. (hm) [Entry date 01/09/92]
Order granting [18-1] stipulation motion stip to continue
hrg on Pla's Mot/amd cmplt previously scheduled for 1/13/92;
reset 2/11/92 at 2:00 p.m., Motion hearing set for 2:00
2/11/92 for [13-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint signed
by RNB, 1/10/92, cc:attys (hm) [Entry date 01/13/92]

1/8/92

18

1/10/92

19

1/13/92

—

Case referred

1/27/92

20

Stipulation by Michael Horn, A. Roland Squires, Arthur J.
Hudachko stip to continue oral argument on pla' mot/amd
cmp (hm) [Entry date 01/28/92]

1/28/92

21

Amd Order granting [20-1] stipulation motion stip to
continue oral argument on pla' mot/amd cmp, Motion hearing
set for 10:30 2/18/92 for [20-1] stipulation motion stip to
continue oral argument on pla' mot/amd cmp signed by RNB,
1/28/92; cc:atty (hm) [Entry date 01/29/92]

2/4/92

22

Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 2:30
2/13/92 for [13-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint JUDGE:
RNB (hm) [Entry date 02/05/92]

2/18/92

23

Minute entry:, Motion hearing held for [13-1] motion to
amend [1-1] complaint granting [13-1] motion to amend
[1-1] complaint; Pla. moves court for voluntary dismissal
w/o prej.; Def. stipulates that cts. 2-6 may be dismissed
w/o prej.; Mr. Gill to prepare order ; Judge: RNB Court
Reporter: electronic Court Deputy: Kim Jones (kj)
[Entry date 02/20/92]

2/18/92

24

Amended complaint by Michael Horn , against :amends [1-1]
complaint; jury demand (hm) [Entry date 03/05/92]

3/16/92

25

Stipulation by Michael Horn, A. Roland Squires, Arthur J.
Hudachko stip to dismiss cnts II-VI w/o prej (hm)

3/18/92

26

Order granting [25-1] stipulation motion stip to dismiss
cnts II-VI w/o prej; granting [13-1] motion to amend [1-1]
complaint; denying [6-1] motion to dismiss w/o prej to
file a renewed mot/to dism based on remaining claims signed
by DKW, 3/18/92; cc:attys (hm)

to Judge Ronald N. Boyce (hm)
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4/16/92

—

Transcript of Proceedings of motion to amend complaint
before RNB for dates of 2/18/92 (hm)

9/22/92

27

Notice of Hearing filed : Initial Pretrial Conference set
for 11:15 10/26/92
JUDGE: SA (hm)

10/26/92 28

Scheduling order signed by SA setting Joining of parties,
amending of pleadings on 12/31/92 Deadline for filing of
all motions 6/18/93 Discovery cutoff 5/28/93 Attorney
conference by 9:00 9/15/93 Final Pretrial Conference for
8:00 9/22/93 Jury Trial for 9:00 10/4/93; cc:attys (hm)
[Entry date 10/27/92]

12/31/92 29

Amended complaint by Michael Hom against Douglas Bordrero
:amends [24-1] amended complaint; jury demand (hm)
[Entry date 01/11/93]

4/20/93

30

Certificate of service of 1st req for prod/docs by Michael
Hom (hm) [Entry date 04/21/93]

4/21/93

31

Certificate of service of 1st req for prod/docs by Michael
Hom (hm) [Entry date 04/22/93]

4/27/93

32

Motion by Michael Hom for default judgment against Arthur
J. Hudachko, A, Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero, to
compel discovery (hm) [Entry date 04/28/93]

4/27/93

33

Memorandum by Michael Hom in support of [32-1] motion for
default judgment against Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland
Squires, Douglas Bordrero, [32-2] motion to compel
discovery (hm) [Entry date 04/28/93]

5/5/93

34

Memorandum by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires,
Douglas Bordrero in opposition to [32-1] motion for
default judgment against Arthur J- Hudachko, A- Roland
Squires, Douglas Bordrero, [3 2-2] motion to compel
discovery (hm) [Entry date 05/06/93]

5/11/93

35

Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 9:30
5/20/93 for [32-1] motion for default judgment against
Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero,
set for 9:30 5/20/93 for [32-2] motion to compel discovery
JUDGE: RNB; cc:attys (hm) [Entry date 05/12/93]

5/12/93

36

Reply by Michael Hom to response to [32-1] motion for
default judgment against Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland
Squires, Douglas Bordrero, [32-2] motion to compel
discovery (hm) [Entry date 05/13/93]

5/13/93

37

Affidavit of L. Zane Gill (hm) [Entry date 05/14/93]

5/14/93

38

Answer by Arthur J. Hudachko, A- Roland Squires to 12/4/91
amended complaint (hm) [Entry date 05/17/93]
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5/18/93

39

Motion by Michael Hom to strike [38-1] complaint answer (hm)
[Entry date 05/19/93]

5/19/93

40

5/19/93

41

Memorandum by Michael Hom in support of [39-1] motion to
strike [3 8-1] complaint answer (hm)
Memorandum by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires in
opposition to [32-1] motion for default judgment against
Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero,
[32-2] motion to compel discovery (hm)

5/19/93

42

Certificate of service of ans to pla's 1st interrog and req
for prod/docs by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires (hm)

5/20/93

—

Motion in open court by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland
Squires, Douglas Bordrero , to set aside default judgment

5/20/93

43

Minute entry:, Motion hearing [0-0] motion to set aside
default judgment, [39-1] motion to strike [38-1] complaint
answer, held for [32-1] motion for default judgment against
Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero,
held for [32-2] motion to compel discovery; scheduling
order deadlines: setting Discovery deadline on 11/1/93
Deadline for filing of all motions by 12/15/93 Final
Pretrial Conference for 8:00 4/4/94 Jury Trial for 9:00
4/18/94; granting [0-0] motion to set aside default
judgment, mooting [39-1] motion to strike [38-1] complaint
answer, granting [32-1] motion for default judgment against
Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero,
granting [32-2] motion to compel discovery; outstanding
discovery due w/in 3 0 days; Answer from Mr. Bordrero due
w/in 15 days ; Judge: RNB Court Reporter: electronic Court
Deputy: Kim Jones (kj)

5/20/93

44

5/20/93

44

Response by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires to
[39-1] motion to strike [38-1] complaint answer (hm)
Motion by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires to strike
[29-1] amended complaint (hm)

5/20/93

45

Acknowledgement of service as to Douglas Bordrero c/o J.
Mark Ward 5/20/93 Answer due on 6/9/93 for Douglas Bordrero
(hm) [Entry date 05/21/93]

5/20/93

46

Answer by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas
Bordrero to 12/31/92 amended complaint (hm)
[Entry date 05/21/93]

(kj)
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5/25/93

47

Order mooting [44-1] motion to strike [29-1] amended
complaint, granting [0-0] motion to set aside default
judgment Dfts Squires and Hudachko's dflt is entered;
however, the dfts motion to set aside dflt is granted and
the dflt is set aside provided dfts shall ans w/i 10 days
of this order, mooting [32-2] motion to compel discovery,
Dft Douglas Bodrero will accept process and an answer will
be made, scheduling order deadlines: setting Discovery
deadline on 11/1/93 Deadline for filing of all motions by
12/15/93 Final Pretrial Conference for 8:00 4/14/94 before
DKW; 5 day (12 Person) Jury Trial for 9:00 4/18/94 Other
outstanding discovery due from dfts shall be answered w/o
30 days of this order signed by RNB, 5/25/93; cc:attys (hm)
[Entry date 05/26/93]

5/27/93

48

Acknowledgement of service as to Douglas Bordrero by J.
Mark Ward 5/2 6/93 Answer due on 6/15/93 for Douglas
Bordrero (hm)

5/27/93

49

Answer by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas
Bordrero to amended complaint (hm)

5/27/93

50

Certificate of service of ans to 2nd req for prod/docs and
1st interrog and req for prod/docs by Arthur J. Hudachko,
A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero (hm)

10/29/93 51

Motion by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas
Bordrero to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st interrog and req
for prod/docs (hm)

11/1/93

Notice of Hearing filed: Motion hearing set for 10:00
11/16/93 for [51-1] motion to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st
interrog and req for prod/docs
JUDGE: RNB (bn)
[Entry date 11/02/93]

52

11/12/93 53

Certificate of service 1st req for adm by Michael Horn (hm)
[Entry date 11/15/93]

11/16/93 54

Minute entry:, Motion hearing held for [51-1] motion to
compel pla to ans dfts' 1st interrog and req for prod/docs
granting [51-1] motion to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st
interrog and req for prod/docs. Face to face conf under
Rule 204(g) is to occur no later than 12-3-93, Pla is to
be present at the conf or to be accessible by phone to
answer questions. Dft to prepare order. ; Judge: Ronald N.
Boyce Court Reporter: Electronic Court Deputy: Sharon K.
Spratley (ss) [Entry date 11/17/93]

12/6/93

55

Notice by Michael Horn to take deposition of UT Dept of
Public Safety, 12/22/93, (hm) [Entry date 12/07/93]

12/6/93

56

Motion by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas
Bordrero to continue trial at least 3 months beyond
present setting (hm) [Entry date 12/07/93]
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Notice by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas
Bordrero to take deposition of Michael Horn, 1/8/94
(hm)
[Entry date 12/07/93]

12/13/93 58

Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 2:00
12/28/93 for [56-1] motion to continue trial at least 3
months beyond present setting
JUDGE: RNB; cc:attys (hm)

12/14/93 59

Notice by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires, Douglas
Bordrero to take deposition of Michael Horn, 1/29/94 (hm)

12/14/93 60

Second Motion by Arthur J. Hudachko, A, Roland Squires,
Douglas Bordrero to compel ans to 1st interrog and req for
prod/docs (hm)

12/14/93 61

Return of service of subpoena duces tecum as to D. Douglas
Bodrero commisioner of UT State Dept of Public Safety c/o
Carolyn Davis executed 12/6/93. (hm) [Entry date 12/15/93]

12/20/93 62

Notice of Hearing filed by defendant Arthur J. Hudachko,
defendant A. Roland Squires, defendant Douglas Bordrero :
Motion hearing set for 2:00 12/28/93 for [60-1] motion to
compel ans to 1st interrog and req for prod/docs
JUDGE:
RNB (sh) [Entry date 12/21/93]

12/20/93 63

Order mooting [51-1] motion to compel pla to ans dfts' 1st
interrog and req for prod/docs. Parties to have an
informal disc cnf pursuant to rule 204-1(g) US Dist Court
Rules. Cnf to be a face to face cnf between cnsl. Pla
Michael Horn is to personally participate in this cnf,
either in person or by phone. Cnf to take place no later
than 12/3/93. If parties are unable to resolve their
differences at this cnf, concerning pla's responses to
dfts' disc requests, then dfts may bring an appropriate
motion to compel signed by RNB, 12/20/93; cc:attys (hm)
[Entry date 12/22/93]

12/22/93 64

Certificate of service of supp ans to 1st interrog by
Michael Horn (hm) [Entry date 12/23/93]
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12/28 91: • 65

1 1 i nute entry:
Motion hrg 1 ie 1 d - gi: an11ng [60- 1 ] m o : : ;
:: - ::: T ij •• ; .1 ans t o 1st interrog and req for prod/docs . Pltf
::: :i : • ::i = :i : s i t o submit dmg calculations by 1/18/94 or b e sub;
sc ,1 i : • !:::i : :1 ns Cnsl t o prepare a form, for the pltf t o sign
under j: .,: ] I /; r of perjury r e t h e dmg. calculations. G r s n t i n j
[56-1] :i ' , : t: ,:i • I: .o continue t r i a l a t least 3 . months te/r- preser „ t: , ,• I !::: J :i .• :j scheduling order d e a d l i n e s : setting
Discover;; :i ; • ,: ::i j :l I , n 5/1/94 Deadline for filing of all
m o t i o n s bj 5 1! 9 1 „nal Pretrial Conference for 8:00 9/7
before J u d g e "1 ?::! i , i r Jury Trial for 9:00 9/26/94, 5 days,
before Ji : „ I gr • "I Ji i , I
W a r d t o submit a n order
reflectii , g !::l • i
f t h e crt on t h e m o t s ; J u d g e : Ronald
N. Boyce Cour
Electronic Court Deputy: Kathlyn
SI iauklas • (kp)

12/28/93 66

Motion by Michael Horn for J o i n d e r R E : [56-1] motion t o
continue trial at least 3 m o n t h s beyond present set4- [Entry date 12/29/93]
I I :: t::::i • :: i : , I ::: ^ 1 iichael Horn t ::: •
[E" I : late 12/29/93]
Certi ficate of service by Michael .i-:m i^ .. .,G Supp_ .-...swers
t: : D e f s ' 1st Set of Interrogs mailed t o cnsl on 1/17/94, , : )
[Entry date 01 II9 '94]'

4/6/94

i"

1 1 ::: t :i • ::: •! i by Arthur J 1 Ii i ilachko, A Roland Squires, Douglas
B :::: r • ii = .r • : t o compel p l a t o subnij t t o a depo at - "' t e &
!::i r \ f i :: :ed by crt (ce) [Entry da te 04/07/94 ~
1 1 am ::: r ai I ::ii iiii I: ;; A i t l m r 3 Hudacl iko, A.XW^JLCM 1 U
D• : i i 3J B s B ::: :i : • ::I::i : ero in support of [68-1] motit
b : • si J : ii: ii t t o a depo at a d a t e & t i me f i x e d by err
[E
; - l a t e 04 /07 /94]

Memoi am ldum by 1 1 ii : :]l!: u .• = . ] 1 1 :: IIEI in o p p o s i t i o n t o [68-1] motion
!:::c c o i n p e 1 p ] a t ::: si :i 1 : • IIII::i t t o a depo at a date & timp f ' vPd '
.• i ( k j ) [ E , i :; L „ i .• : 1 / 1 2 / 9 4 ]

4 n 1 '94

<

>94

. v e 1 pla"
(ce)

/JL

4/28/94

5/2/S

Docket as c

1 I :::: • tice of Heari ng fj 1 = .• ::i : Motioi i 1: learing set for
1 2 8/94 f or [ 68 II J m :: • t i ::: i i t o compel p l a t o submit to a der
ai a' date .5, t:::i • • i f i : : i l ] crt
J U D G E : RNB. cc: - +- —
Mi i m t e entry:, Mo tion hearing held for [68-1] motion t o
: .• : .i i[]j:: = .] pla t o submit t o a depo at a date & time fixed b y
: :i : t :::::i c ,i iting [68-1] motion t o compel pla t o submit t o a
i = ;;: o at a date & time fixed by crt. Depo of pla is t o b e
tc J :en on 5/14/94. Dft t o prepare order, ; Judge: Ronald N
B : : - • : •• = Court Reporter: -electronic Court Deputy: Sharon K
" a _ e y (ss) r P ^ r y date 04/29/94]
cf service executed re subp served on records
i cf Utah Dept of Public Safety c
"
's
- T6/94 'ce) [Entry date 05/03/c .
^ecembe:
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10/11/94 91

Memorandum by Michael Horn, in^oppjo^siticm to [89-1]
suppTementTair support 'memorandum re due* process issues in
supp of dfts mot/sum jgm AND memo in support of [90-1]
motion to amend [1-1] complaint (ce) [Entry date 10/12/94]

10/14/94 92

Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 2:00
10/31/94 for [90-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint JUDGE:
RNB (sh) [Entry date 10/17/94]

10/18/94 93

Reply brief RE: [91-1] opposition/support memorandum filed
by A. Roland Squires, Douglas Bordrero (cs)
[Entry date 10/19/94]

10/25/94 94

Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 8:00
11/22/94 for [84-1] motion for summary judgment dism the
amd cmp w/prej
JUDGE: DKW. cc: atty (ce)

10/25/94 95

Motion by Michael Horn to use investigative internal
affairs file as evidence at trial (ce) [Entry date 10/26/94]

10/25/94 96

Memorandum by Michael Horn in support of [95-1] motion to
use investigative internal affairs file as evidence at
trial (ce) [Entry date 10/26/94]

10/28/94 97

Memorandum by Arthur J. Hudachko, A. Roland Squires,
Douglas Bordrero in opposition to [90-1] motion to amend
[1-1] complaint (ce)

10/28/94 98

Notice of Hearing filed : Motion hearing set for 2:00
11/18/94 for [95-1] motion to use investigative internal
affairs file as evidence at trial
JUDGE: RNB. cc:
atty (ce) [Entry date 10/31/94]

10/31/94 99

Minute entry:, Motion hearing held for [90-1] motion to
amend [1-1] complaint Pltf rep by Zane Gill; dft rep by
Mark Ward. After hrg arguments from cnsl, further briefing
is requested. Pltf brief is due 11/10/94 and resp is due
11/16/94 - [90-1] motion to amend [1-1] complaint taken
under advisement ; Judge: RNB Court Reporter: electronic
Court Deputy: Michelle Peart (mp) [Entry date 11/03/94]

11/1/94

Transcript of Proceedings for dates of 9/8/94 re final
pretrial conf held before DKW (ce) [Entry date 11/03/94]

—

11/10/94 100

Supplemental Memorandum RE: [90-1] motion to amend [1-1]
complaint filed by Michael Horn (ce) [Entry date 11/14/94]

11/10/94 100

Reply by Michael Horn to response to [90-1] motion to amend
[1-1] complaint (ce) [Entry date 11/14/94]

11/15/94 101

Reply brief of dfts RE: [100-1] supp memo of pla's re
mot/amd cmp (ce) [Entry date 11/16/94]
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Response by UT Dept Pub Safety tt
investigative internal affairs £
[Entry date 11/17/94]

94

9 5-1] motion to use
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igned oy

ummary
1 2/1/94,

:>r Arthur J- " . " hko, ? Roland Squires, Douglas
coru
against Michael Hum signed by DKW, 12/1/94.
Pla'
d cmp dism w/prej. All parties to bear own atty
fees/costs
~" -+---- '--*

106

e closed ice)

12/1 /94
12 I "!:: ' Ir
12/1/ 94

„

[84-1] motion for
*j.
Pla rep by L.
f cnsl heard. [84-1]
rej taken
Reporter:
ine
(ch)

^ L;y: M.
surjna: y 3 udgment
Zar.e *ill. Def r>
mo**o for summary
under advisement ;
Raymond Fenlon
M

t

affairs file as e
"t rep by M^ *
3nying in ±
iirs file a
Crt advise
[1-1? cor
: RNB Cour -«~<~ 'kj)

107

12/2/"54

—

• ::: yce

(c€ )

of 1
re subp served on Dan Taylor,
.. .r 94; t .
/23/94; Ron Stringham, 11/29/94;
.^^.:-Po Lee, 11/21/94; Judy Sorensen, 11/21/94; Phil
. m g e n p e e l , 11/21/94; Cheri Ertel, 11/22/94; Robert W.
L-draner, 11/22/94; Richard Townsend, 11/23/94; Thomas
r^-le
11/22/94; Yolanda Stout, 11/22/94 - all served c/o
' **a—:e-C^ * 'ceN fEntry date 1 2 / 0 2 ' ^ *
: . i - r,ed order from Arthur J. h
'.as Bordrero re; H p n v ^ a :
-y date 12/05/94

.A.
- 'a~d

, . . ^*=

"nmplaint
by RNB, 12/8/9
[ Entr
12/20/94 109

Docket as cj

1

nQ'94]

Notice of appeal by Michael Hum, Fie Status: pd #64302.
Appeals to the USCA for the Tent h circuit from the jgm
pntp.rp.d on 12/1/94 and ordei entered on 12/8/94. (rb)
jGCCilH-iV
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[Entry date 12/21/94]
12/21/94 110

Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA:
[109-1] appeal pkts sent to cnsl. (rb)
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